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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. Rodney Johnson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1992 session of the General Assembly enacted legislation
dealing with wills, trusts, and estates that added, amended, or re-
pealed a number of sections of the Code of Virginia (the Code). In
addition, in the year ending June 1, 1992, there were five cases
from the Supreme Court of Virginia and two from the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals which involve issues of interest to both the
general practitioner and the specialist in wills, trusts, and estates.




The 1990 session of the General Assembly abolished the inter-
ests of dower and curtesy in realty and the surviving spouse's
forced statutory share in personalty, effective January 1, 1991, and
replaced them with a surviving spouse's elective right in an aug-
mented estate composed of realty and personalty.2 Following a
year of silence, the 1992 legislation makes a number of clarifying
and substantive amendments to the original that are intended to
make this a better law, as well as one that is easier to understand
* Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1965,
College of William and Mary; J.D., 1967, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William
and Mary; LL.M., 1970, New York University.
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Code of Virginia sections, they will be
generally referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated,
those section numbers will refer to the latest printing of the old sections and to the 1992
supplement for the new sections.
2. Act of Apr. 9, 1990, ch. 831, 1990 Va. Acts 1354 (codified as amended at scattered
sections of VA. CODE. ANN.). An excellent analysis of this comprehensive legislation will be
found in J. William Gray, Jr., Virginia's Augmented Estate System: An Overview, 24 U.
RICH. L. REv. 513 (1990). For background, see J. Rodney Johnson, Abolition of Dower in
Virginia: The Uniform Probate Code as an Alternative to Proposed Legislation, 7 U. RIcH.
L. REV. 99 (1972); and J. Rodney Johnson, Interspousal Property Rights at Death, VA. B.
Ass'N J., Summer 1984, at 10.
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and apply. Instead of attempting to present these amendments in
any priority order, they are considered in the order that they ap-
pear in the Code.
1. The Probate Estate
The original opening sentence of section 64.1-16.1 begins a
lengthy definition by stating "[t]he augmented estate means the
estate, real and personal, .... . s The use of the unmodified word
"estate" at this point caused some lawyers to worry about the po-
tential for double inclusion of some assets in the computation of
the augmented estate. This concern was caused by certain lan-
guage found in the closing sentence of this section giving further
definition to the word estate.4 By way of illustration, it was noted
that life insurance payable to a third party clearly would be in-
cluded in the decedent's augmented estate by section 64.1-
16.1(3)(b), ' and perhaps also by the word "estate," in this section's
opening sentence.' The inclusion in the latter case would be due to
the definition of the word "estate" in the section's last sentence,
i.e., "the terms 'estate' and 'property' shall include insurance poli-
cies. . . .", Although such a possibility would appear to be quite
remote, it is completely eliminated by a 1992 amendment that
causes the opening sentence to now read "[t]he augmented estate
means the estate passing by testate or intestate succession, real
and personal, .... ."s The additional words added by this amend-
ment clarify that the word "estate" is being used in the section's
opening sentence to identify what is customarily thought of as the
"probate estate." This clarification will preclude any pickup of life
insurance or any of the other items enumerated in the section's
closing sentence that are payable to third parties.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (emphasis added).
4. The last sentence of VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 reads as follows:
As used in this section the terms "estate" and "property" shall include insurance
policies, retirement benefits exclusive of federal social security benefits, annuities,
pension plans, deferred compensation arrangements, and employee benefit plans to
the extent owned by, vested in, or subject to the control of the decedent on the date
of his death or the date of an irrevocable transfer by him during his lifetime.
Id.
5. Section 64.1-16.1(3)(b) brings property transfers over which the transferror retains a
right of revocation into the augmented estate. Id. § 64.1-16.1(3)(b).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
7. Id.
8. Acts of Apr. 3, 1992, chs. 617 & 647, 1992 Va. Acts 897, 953 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)) (emphasis added).
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2. Death Taxes
As originally written, the lengthy definition of the augmented es-
tate that begins in the opening sentence of section 64.1-16.1 pro-
vided for a deduction of all "charges of administration" of a dece-
dent's estate.9 However, the statute made no express statement
concerning the inclusion or exclusion of death taxes in charges of
administration because it was believed they were already excluded
by Virginia's estate and inheritance tax apportionment rules.10
However, a 1990 decision by a three-judge panel of the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals cast some doubt on this assumption and, al-
though this panel decision was later reversed by the full court,"
this experience suggested that a legislative response was desirable.
To this end, a 1992 amendment makes this portion of the defini-
tion now read "charges of administration which shall not include
federal or state transfer taxes . . This amendment, combined
with the death tax apportionment rules, will prevent the property
passing to the surviving spouse from being reduced by any federal
or state death taxes to the extent that the property qualifies for
the federal estate tax marital deduction. It should also be noted
that, although this discussion has focused upon death taxes only,
the amending language is given broader scope by its use of the
term "transfer taxes."' This broader term includes not only tradi-
tional death taxes but also generation-skipping transfer taxes as
well.' 4
3. Spousal Transfers
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 64.1-16.1, which bring certain
spousal transfers into the computation of the augmented estate,
both include "[t]he value of property, other than tangible personal
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
10. See id., which provides in part that, in making the proration of death taxes among
persons interested in a decedent's estate, "each such person shall have the benefit of any
exemptions, deductions and exclusions allowed by such law in respect of such person or the
property passing to him.. . ..." Id.
11. Estate of Reno v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 733 (4th
Cir. 1991) (en banc). This case is discussed infra at notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cure. Supp. 1992)(emphasis added).
13. See id.
14. The federal generation-skipping transfer tax is found at I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (West
1988). The Virginia generation skipping transfer tax is found at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-935
to -938 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
19921
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property."' 5 The express exclusion of tangible personal property
was designed to eliminate the need for the surviving spouse to ac-
count for typical spousal gifts that might be made on the occasion
of a birthday, anniversary or religious holiday, which ordinarily
would not be economically significant.16 The quoted language has
given rise to the three following questions: (1) Is a gift of realty
that is subsequently exchanged for tangible personalty that is
owned at death excluded? (2) What about the reverse? (3) What
about proceeds? These questions are answered by a 1992 amend-
ment that changes the quoted language to now read: "[t]he value
of property, other than tangible personal property received by gift
and the proceeds thereof .... "17 This amendment provides a
specific answer to the question concerning proceeds. It also insures
that the inclusion/exclusion decision will be based upon the char-
acter of the property at the time of the gift and will not be affected
by subsequent exchanges.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 64.1-16.1 appeared as a single par-
agraph in the Uniform Probate Code provision from which they
were taken.18 When this single paragraph was divided in the Vir-
ginia version, the drafters failed to include some of the qualifying
language from the original into both of the new paragraphs.19 To
remedy this problem, a 1992 amendment adds the language "with-
out a full consideration in money or money's worth" to paragraph
2.20 This amendment gives expression to the original intent that
only gifts are to be brought back into the computation of the aug-
mented estate.2
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
16. Though this was the intent of the exception, the language thereof admits of no such
restriction. Thus the potential consequences attached to gifts of tangible personal property
such as jewelry, artwork, and automobiles, when contrasted with gifts of such as cash, secur-
ities, and real estate, is not to be ignored.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
18. PRE-1990 UNIF. PROa. CODE § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1983).
19. Section 64.1-16.1 did not include the words "without a full consideration in money or
money's worth." Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-16.1(1), (2) (Repl. Vol. 1991) with PRE-
1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(2), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1983).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(2)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
21. See id. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
[Vol. 26:873
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4. The Pull-Back
The goal of section 64.1-16.1(3) is to include certain inter vivos
gifts of the decedent in the computation of the augmented estate.22
The specific goal of this provision's subparagraph (d) is to bring
back certain outright transfers,23 as contrasted with transfers in
which the decedent retained some control or connection, which are
the subject of subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c). 24 As the former law
of dower and curtesy had applied to transfers of real estate that
were made at any time during the marriage to the surviving
spouse, so also the primary focus of the original pull-back provi-
sion of subparagraph (d) was upon outright gifts of realty or per-
sonalty made at any time during the marriage.25 Opponents of this
unlimited pull-back claimed it was unworkable and would result in
confusion in titles to property, notwithstanding the fact that un-
limited pull-back was a part of the dower and curtesy laws that
"worked" from the founding of the Commonwealth until their re-
peal in 1991. As introduced, the 1992 amendment would have re-
duced the scope of the pull-back provision to gifts made during the
calendar year of the decedent's death and the two preceding calen-
dar years.26 Lobbying efforts, emphasizing the ease with which
such a severely limited (i.e., two-year) pull-back would enable one
to seriously damage the "fair-share" rights of a surviving spouse,
resulted in the final version of the pull-back period being the cal-
endar year of the decedent's death and the preceding five calendar
years.2 7 Although the five-year rule is obviously preferable to the
originally proposed two-year rule, it nevertheless represents a sig-
nificant weakening of the protection originally granted a surviving
22. Id.
23. See id. § 64.1-16.1(3)(d).
24. See id. § 64.1-16.1(3)(a)-(c).
25. See id. § 64.1-16.1(3)(d). Prior to the 1992 amendment, § 64.1-16.1(3)(d) read as fol-
lows: "Any transfer made to or for the benefit of a donee to the extent that (i) the transfer
was made causa mortis or (ii) the aggregate transfers to any donee exceed $10,000 in a
calendar year." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(3)(d) (Repl. Vol. 1991). The qualifying language,
"at any time during the marriage to the surviving spouse," is found in the introductory
language of § 64.1-16.1(3) and is applicable to each of its four subparagraphs. Id. § 64.1-
16.1(3).
26. H.B. 590, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1991) (as introduced); S.B. 137, Va. Gen.
Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1992)(as introduced).
27. Section 64.1-16.1(3)(d) now reads as follows: "Any transfer made to or for the benefit
of a donee within the calendar year of the decedent's death or any of the five preceding
calendar years to the extent that the aggregate value of the transfers to the donee exceeds
$10,000 in that calendar year." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(3)(d)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
1992J
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spouse. In effect, this amendment provides a statutorily guaran-
teed loophole which enables a person to deplete the estate to the
detriment of the surviving spouse by making one or a series of sig-
nificant gifts, unlimited in amount, so long as they are made more
than five calendar years before the year of death.
A comparison of the text of original section 64.1-16.1(3)(d)2 s and
1992 section 64.1-16.1(3)(d)29 discloses a further difference in
wording, but not necessarily result, due to the language of another
provision. Original section 64.1-16.1(3)(d) expressly provided for
the pull-back of every causa mortis gift, including those under the
$10,000.00 threshold otherwise applicable to outright gifts.30 New
section 64.1-16.1(3)(d) contains no such language.31 However, a gift
causa mortis is by definition a revocable gift32 and section 64.1-
16.1(3)(b) includes in the computation of the augmented estate all
revocable gifts made during the marriage.3 3 Accordingly, the con-
clusion that the decedent's causa mortis gifts are still included in
the computation of the augmented estate appears inescapable.
5. Separate Property
In addition to the provisions of section 64.1-16.1 that cause cer-
tain property to be included in the computation of a decedent's
augmented estate, there is one paragraph that provides for certain
property to be excluded from this computation. This unnumbered
paragraph, which comes immediately after section 64.1-16.1(3)(d),
is divided into three clauses.34 The original language of clause (ii)
provides for the exclusion of "property, its income or proceeds, re-
ceived by the decedent by gift, will, or intestate succession during
28. See supra note 25.
29. See supra note 27.
30. See supra note 25.
31. See supra note 27.
32. There is a "condition attached by implication of law to every gift causa mortis - that
it does not take effect absolutely and irrevocably except in case of the death of the donor."
Thomas v. First Nat'l Bank, 166 Va. 497, 509, 186 S.E. 77, 82-83 (1936) (quoting Johnson v.
Colley, 101 Va. 414, 418, 44 S.E. 721, 722 (1903)).
33. Section 64.1-16.1(3)(b) reads as follows:
b. Any transfer to the extent that the decedent retained for his life, for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in
fact end before his death, a power, either alone or in conjunction with any other
person, to revoke or to consume, invade, or dispose of the principal for his own
benefit;
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(3)(b) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
34. See id. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
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the marriage to the surviving spouse" so long a§ it is maintained as
separate property. 5 The idea behind this exclusion was that per-
sons who were going to marry could contract however they wished
(if they wished) with regard to property they had already inher-
ited; but married persons who inherited property did not enjoy an
equivalent bargaining position. A 1992 amendment extends this
"separate property" exclusion to such property acquired "before or
"~36during the marriage to the surviving spouse ....
Accordingly, if H (who has $100,000 of previously-inherited
property) marries W (who has $100,000 of previously-earned prop-
erty), H will have augmented estate rights in W's $100,000 but W
will not have any such rights in H's $100,000. Query the fairness of
such a provision when, in the ordinary case, neither of the parties
will have any idea that such a disparity exists. Although one might
initially think that this amendment merely parallels a rule already
in force in divorce law, it should be noted that the referenced as-
pect of divorce law is focusing upon a restoration of the status quo
in a failed marriage, whereas the augmented estate law is con-
cerned with fairness in a marriage that has continued until its nat-
ural termination.
6. Third Party Contribution
The concept of recognizing certain property transfers made to
third parties as still in the augmented estate raises the obvious is-
sue of the liability of the recipients thereof to make contribution
towards the payment of the surviving spouse's share. The original
language of section 64.1-16.2(C) makes it clear that the contribu-
tion liability being imposed is not a personal liability of the recipi-
ent but instead is a property liability because it is limited "to the
extent such persons have the property or its proceeds. ' 37 However,
this limiting language does not address the time at which such pos-
session is relevant. It leaves open the further question of whether
or not a recipient can avoid liability by consuming or gifting the
recoverable property following the decedent's death. A 1992
amendment answers this question in the negative by amending the
above quoted language to read "to the extent such persons have
35. Id.
36. Id. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 64.1-16.2(C)(Repl. Vol. 1991).
1992] 879
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the property or its proceeds on or after the date of the decedent's
death."38
Another interpretation problem was raised by the original open-
ing words of section 64.1-16.2(C), which restrict any contribution
liability to "original transferees from or appointees of the dece-
dent, and subsequent gratuitous inter vivos donees or persons
claiming by testate or intestate succession. . .. "3 It was uncertain
whether this language imposed contribution liability regarding as-
sets in a decedent's estate upon the estate's personal representa-
tive or upon each of its beneficiaries. In response to this problem, a
1992 amendment imposes the contribution liability upon "a fiduci-
ary, as to the property under the fiduciary's control at or after the
time a fiduciary receives notice that a surviving spouse has claimed
an elective share in the decedent's estate. ' 40 The 1992 amendment
clearly imposes contribution liability upon a personal representa-
tive of a decedent's estate insofar as the decedent's probate per-
sonal property is concerned. 41 But what about the decedent's real
estate passing by intestate or testate succession? As a decedent's
intestate real estate is not "property under the fiduciary's con-
trol, '42 any contribution liability imposed upon such property
must be sought from the heirs. Regarding real estate passing by
testate succession, the rule is that "(e)xecutors, by virtue of their
office as such, have no power over the real estate. Any power which
they have must be conferred by the will itself, either in terms or by
implication."4 Although the testate cases will pose no problem
when realty is devised to the executor, or the will directs the sale
of the realty, the answer is unclear in other cases. Query: Does the
38. Acts of Apr. 3, 1992, chs. 617 & 647, 1992 Va. Acts 897, 953 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-16.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)) (emphasis added).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.2(C)(Repl. Vol. 1991).
40. Id. This amendment continues with another sentence that reads as follows:
A corporate fiduciary shall not be considered to have notice until it receives notice at
its address as shown in the decedent's estate papers in the clerk's office or, if there
are no such papers or no address is shown therein, at the office of its registered agent.
Id.
41. The amendment also determines the identity of the one with the contribution liability
when dealing with other fiduciaries such as, for example, the trustee of an inter vivos trust,
the custodian under the Virginia Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-37
to -59 (Cum. Supp. 1992)), and the custodial trustee under the Virginia Uniform Custodial
Trust Act (VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-34.1 to .19 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1992). "An administrator of an intestate
decedent has nothing whatever to do with the administration or management of his dece-
dent's real property." BROCKENBROUGH LAMB, VIRGINIA PROBATE PRACTIcE § 6 (1957).
43. Neblett v. Smith, 142 Va. 840, 855, 128 S.E. 247, 251-52 (1925).
[Vol. 26:873
WILLS, TRUST, AND ESTATES
standard will-writing practice of conferring upon the executor a
power of sale over the decedent's real estate"' cause such real es-
tate to be "property under the fiduciary's control" 5 within the
meaning of the 1992 amendment quoted above? There is no clear
answer. However, it is the normal practice of clerks of court (in
determining the amount of bond), commissioners of account (in
determining inventory placement and fees), and corporate execu-
tors (in determining fees) to take the position that an executor's
power of sale over realty brings that realty "under the fiduciary's
control," and such will be the argument for purposes of the aug-
mented estate.
There is one final amendment to section 64.1-16.2(C) 46 that fur-
ther clarifies the contribution liability of third parties. As the origi-
nal language began by stating that "[o]nly original transferees
from or appointees of the decedent, and subsequent gratuitous in-
ter vivos donees or persons claiming by testate or intestate succes-
sion are subject to any contribution to make up the elective share
of the surviving spouse," ''" it was clear that no other parties could
be liable. However, a concern subsequently arose about the poten-
tial ability of an electing surviving spouse's attorney to wrongfully,
but effectively, freeze assets held by third party payors by (i) plac-
ing them upon notice of the election, and (ii) informing them of an
intent to hold them personally liable for payments to a beneficiary
who subsequently avoided contribution liability.
To prevent such conduct, and to assure insurance companies, fi-
nancial institutions, transfer agents, etc., that they may pay or de-
liver money or property to whomever may be entitled delivery by
the terms of their contract without having to worry about claims of
wrongful payment because of an election under the augmented es-
tate laws, the final 1992 amendment to section 64.1-16.2(C) clari-
fied the original intent by providing as follows:
No other party is subject to contribution to make up the elective
share even though the party makes a payment or transfers an item
of property or other benefit to any person with actual knowledge
44. Conferring a power of sale is sometimes done expressly, but most often by incorporat-
ing by reference the boilerplate administrative powers found in VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57
(Cum. Supp. 1992).
45. Id. § 64.1-16.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
46. Id.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 1991) (emphasis added).
1992] 881
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that a surviving spouse has claimed an elective share in the dece-
dent's estate.48
B. Augmented Estate-Related
In addition to the foregoing amendments made to the statutes
directly comprising the augmented estate, the 1992 General As-
sembly amended one code section and added three new ones deal-
ing with other matters as well as the augmented estate.
1. Spousal Consent
Under the prior law of dower and curtesy, a person's spouse was
required to join in any conveyance of the person's real estate, even
though it was individually owned, in order to release the spouse's
inchoate dower or curtesy claim.49 When one spouse joined in a
deed conveying property owned by the other, section 55-41 pro-
vided that the deed would be effective to convey the spouse's in-
choate dower or curtesy in the subject real estate but the spouse
would not be bound by any warranty or covenant contained in the
deed unless expressly stated.50 This rule is maintained as to deeds
delivered prior to the repeal of dower and curtesy on January 1,
1991.11 As to deeds delivered after December 31, 1990, the 1992
amendment to section 55-41 provides that it will "operate to mani-
fest the spouse's written consent or joinder, as contemplated in §
64.1-16.1 to the transfer embraced therein. ' 52 The reference to sec-
tion 64.1-16.1 is to its exclusion provision that reads "[n]othing
herein shall cause to be included in the augmented estate (i) the
value of any property transferred by the decedent during marriage
with the written consent or joinder of the surviving spouse
",53
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.2(C)(Cum. Supp. 1992).
49. Id. § 64.1-19 (Repl. Vol. 1987), repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1990, ch. 831, 1990 Va. Acts.
50. Id. § 55-41(Cum. Supp. 1992).
51. See Acts of Apr. 3, 1992, chs. 617 & 647, 1992 Va. Acts 897, 953 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-41 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
52. Id.
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
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2. Infant Spouses
Section 55-42.1, a new code section added in 1992, deals with
how an infant spouse may release any interests in the other
spouse's property.5 4 This section, which is of dubious need and
equal wisdom, reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the disability of infancy, on or after January 1,
1991, an infant spouse, whether married before or after January 1,
1991, may release his or her marital rights in the other spouse's real
or personal property by uniting in any contract, deed, or other in-
strument executed by the other spouse or by a commissioner of a
court pursuant to a decree entered under §§ 8.01-67 through 8.01-77
or any other law with respect to the infant's property.5
Sections 16.1-331 to -333 authorize a legal proceeding for the
emancipation of any minor who has reached the age of sixteen
years in three circumstances, one of which is "the minor has en-
tered into a valid marriage . ..."56 A married minor who has been
emancipated may enter into a binding contract, buy and sell real
property, and execute releases in his own name.5" Such being the
case, and neither the time nor the costs of an emancipation pro-
ceeding ordinarily being a material consideration, the primary fo-
cus of the new statute appears to be (i) married children under the
age of sixteen, and (ii) married children between sixteen and eigh-
teen whom the court might find not competent to manage financial
affairs.58 To grant carte blanche to such children, vis-a-vis releas-
ing their augmented estate rights in the event of their spouse's
death, and perhaps their equitable distribution rights in the event
of a divorce, appears to put a class of unprotected persons at the
mercy of those who may be most inclined to take advantage of
them. 9
54. Acts of Apr. 3, 1992, chs. 617 & 647, 1992 Va. Acts 897, 953 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-42.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
55. Id.
56. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-333(i) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
57. Id. § 16.1-334(2), (6), & (14) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
58. Id. § 55-42.1 (Cure. Supp. 1992).
59. Although the former law of dower and curtesy had a release provision for married
infants, that law was placed on the books when the age of majority was twenty-one and
when a spouse had to join in all transfers of real estate. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (Repl.
Vol. 1987), repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1990, ch. 831, 1990 Va. Acts 1354. Today, however,
because of the BFP rule, the spouse only needs to join in estate-depleting gifts to third
1992] 883
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3. Equitable Separate Estates
Under the prior law of dower and curtesy, a surviving spouse
had no entitlement thereto in the equitable separate estate of the
other.6 0 For this reason, it became customary to automatically in-
sert boilerplate "separate equitable estate" provisions in deeds and
wills. With the elimination of dower and curtesy, effective January
1, 1991, such provisions became meaningless. However, the diffi-
culty in proving a negative, coupled with the inadvertent failure to
repeal section 55-4761 in the 1990 legislation, left some lawyers
wondering if there might not be some meaning left in these words
- at least insofar as pre-January 1, 1991 documents are con-
cerned. In an attempt to put this matter to rest with finality, sec-
tion 55-47.1 was added in 1992 to provide that
[t]he estate known as the equitable separate estate no longer exists
and any language in any writing, whenever executed, which purports
to convey real property to a person as an equitable separate estate
has no legal or equitable significance after January 1, 1991, except as
provided in § 64.1-19.2.12
parties that would operate to the spouse's disadvantage. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-16.1(3)
(Repl. Vol. 1991) (BFP rule); 64.1-16.2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
60. Former § 64.1-21 provided as follows:
A surviving spouse shall not be entitled to dower or curtesy in the equitable sepa-
rate estate of the deceased spouse if such right thereto has been expressly excluded
by the instrument creating the same, or if the instrument, executed heretofore or
hereafter, describes the estate as his or her sole and separate equitable estate.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1987), repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1990, ch. 831, 1990 Va.
Acts 1354.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-47 now reads as follows:
Nothing contained in the preceding sections of this chapter shall be construed to
prevent the creation of equitable separate estates. They may be created as heretofore
and shall be held in all respects according to the provisions of the instrument by
which they are created and with all the powers conferred by such instrument.
VA. CODE: ANN. § 55-47 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
It should be noted that this section appeared in the Married Women's Property Act, VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 55-35 to -47.1 (Repl. Vol. 1986) and, as its reference to separate equitable
estates related only to women, it would be unconstitutional as gender-based legislation fol-
lowing the elimination of such estates for men by the 1990 legislation. It was repealed by
Acts of Apr. 3, 1992, chs. 617 & 647, 1992 Va. Acts 897, 953.
62. Acts of Apr. 3, 1992, chs. 617 & 647, 1992 Va. Acts 897, 953 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-47.01 (Cum. Supp. 1992)). The reference to § 64.1-19.2 is to the provision providing for
the retention of all laws relating to dower and curtesy insofar as rights thereunder had
vested prior to January 1, 1991. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.2 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
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4. Bona Fide Purchaser
As noted above in part II.A.4. of this article, the goal of section
64.1-16.1(3) is to include certain of the decedent's inter vivos gifts
in computing the augmented estate. 3 Because that section is con-
cerned only with gifts, it includes only "(t)he value of property
transferred to anyone other than a bona fide purchaser by the de-
cedent . ". .., The bona fide purchaser (BFP) exclusion was not
in the Uniform Probate Code as originally promulgated. 5 It was
added in 1975, due to the objections of real property experts in
Colorado, in order to eliminate any need for a spousal joinder in
the deed of a married person to a BFP.6 This BFP language was
adopted as a part of the Virginia augmented estate legislation for
the same reason. Nevertheless, as soon as the new law became ef-
fective, Virginia title companies began to routinely require spousal
joinder to most deeds of married persons on the ground that, ab-
sent a statutory definition of a bona fide purchaser, they did not
know what one was.7 This was surprising to a number of Virginia
attorneys because the title companies had not previously evidenced
any difficulty with the interpretation and application of sections
64.1-95,68 64.1-96,e9 and 64.1-113 7 of the Code, each of which deals
with bona fide purchasers. Nevertheless, to pacify title insurers,
section 64.1_0171 was added to the Code in 1992 to provide a defini-
63. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(3) (Repl. Vol. 1991 & Cum. Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
65. See PRE-1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 80 cmt. (1983).
66. Id.
67. Section 2-202(3) of the PRE-1990 Uniform Probate Code contained a definition of
bona fide purchaser which provided as follows:
For purposes of this section a bona fide purchaser is a purchaser for value in good
faith and without notice of any adverse claim. Any recorded instrument on which a
state documentary fee is noted pursuant to [insert appropriate -reference] is prima
facie evidence that the transfer described therein was made to a bona fide purchaser.
PRE-1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 202(3), 8 U.L.A. 77 (1983). This definition was not used in the
original Virginia enactment because the first sentence would have added nothing to existing
law, and the second sentence (which only created a prima facie case) had no meaning in
Virginia's conveyancing process.
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-95 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (entitled "Bona fide purchaser of real estate
without notice of devise protected.").
69. Id. § 64.1-96 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (entitled "Same; later will.").
70. Id. § 64.1-113 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (dealing with the title of "bona fide purchasers" from
a presumed decedent's personal representative, spouse, heir or devisee when it is later dis-
covered that the supposed decedent is alive).
71. Acts of Apr. 3, 1992, chs. 617 & 647, 1992 Va. Acts 897, 953 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.1-01(CuE. Supp. 1992)).
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tion of bona fide purchaser 72 that will apply not only to the aug-
mented estate but to the entirety of Title 64.1.1' A casual inspec-
tion of the definition will show that it contains nothing that would
be novel to a first year law student, except possibly for its second
sentence, providing that "[n]otice of a seller's marital status, or no-
tice of the existence of a premarital or marital agreement, does not
affect the status of a bona fide purchaser."' " As this definition is
the same as that proposed in the 1991 session, it is expected to
eliminate the joinder problem when it becomes effective on July 1,
1992. s
C. Durable Powers of Attorney - Gifts
An increasingly frequent question following the incapacity of a
person concerns the possibility of gifts being made on that person's
behalf. In a small number of cases, the issue arises in an estate
planning context, with the goal of reducing a future death tax bur-
den through a reduction in the incapacitated person's estate by
means of inter vivos gifts to those who would ultimately take the
estate anyway. However, the question most often arises in the con-
text of a desire to pauperize an incapacitated person in order to
qualify that person for Medicaid benefits, and thereby preserve for
others, through inter vivos gifts to them, property that might oth-
erwise be consumed in the care of the incapacitated person. Re-
gardless of how the issue arises, the fundamental legal question is
72. The inspiration for this definition was § 9 of the Uniform Marital Property Act, which
was entitled "Protection of Bona Fide Purchasers Dealing With Spouses," UNIF. MARITAL
PRop. AcT § 9, 9A U.L.A. 120 (1987).
73. The definition of "bona fide purchaser" reads in full as follows:
As used in this title, "bona fide purchaser" means a purchaser of property for value
who has acted in the transaction in good faith. Notice of a seller's marital status, or
notice of the existence of a premarital or marital agreement, does not affect the status
of a bona fide purchaser. A "purchaser" is one who acquires property by sale, lease,
discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, or lien or who otherwise deals with property
in a voluntary transaction, other than a gift. A purchaser gives "value" for property
acquired in return for a binding commitment to extend credit to the transferor or
another as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim, or in
return for any other consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-.01 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
74. Id.
75. This conclusion is based on the report that "[r]epresentatives of Virginia title insur-
ance companies had given the sponsor [of the 1991 legislation] written assurances that, if
the definition were added to the statute, they would no longer require the spouse to sign
every deed." J. William Gray, Jr., Administering the "Augmented" Estate, VA. B. ASS'N J.,
Summer 1991, at 9, 11.
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the same: "Can the agent make gifts on behalf of the incapacitated
principal?" In the absence of any Virginia rule, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently concluded in Estate of Casey v. Com-
missionert that the Virginia courts would probably not recognize
an agent's authority to make gifts in the absence of express lan-
guage to that effect in the power of attorney.
77
In response to the Casey decision, the 1992 General Assembly
enacted section 11-9.5,'7 a three-part statute. The first part recog-
nizes an agent's implied power to make gifts "in accordance with
the principal's personal history of making or joining in the making
of lifetime gifts," if the power (i) provides that an agent can "do,
execute, or perform any act that the principal might or could do,"
or (ii) "evidences the principal's intent to give the attorney-in-fact
or agent full power to handle the principal's affairs or deal with the
principal's property. 7'9 As the writer has never seen a profession-
ally prepared general power of attorney that did not contain the
"do all acts" language of clause (i), the only issue under the new
statute, and the only protection that an incapacitated principal
will have against a predatory agent, will be the "personal history"
qualification. The importance of this matter cannot be exaggerated
because, if this "personal history" test is met, the statute expressly
provides that the "agent shall have the power and authority to
make gifts in any amount of any of the principal's property to any
individuals" or federally recognized charities.
8 0
The second part of section 11-9.5 provides that the first part
"shall not in any way impair the right or power of any principal, by
express words in the power of attorney or other writing, to author-
ize, or limit the authority of, any attorney-in-fact or other agent to
make gifts of the principal's property." 81
The third part of section 11-9.5 enables the circuit court to au-
thorize an agent to make gifts "to the extent not inconsistent with
76. Estate of Casey v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 176 (1989), rev'd 948 F.2d 895
(4th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied - F.2d - (12/4/91). For a brief discussion of this case, see
infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
77. For a complete discussion of this case, see H. Michael Deneka, Estate of Casey v.
Commissioner, Revisited and Reversed, VA. ST. B. TR. & EST. SEc. NEWSL., Spring 1992, at
23.
78. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 544, 1992 Va. Acts 708 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.5
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-9.5(A) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 11-9.5(B) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
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the express terms of the power of attorney," under appropriate
circumstances.82
Because of the uncertainty surrounding the "personal history"
rule and its potential for abuse,83 as well as the possible adverse
estate and gift tax consequences that might attach to such an im-
plied power,84 attorneys will need to consider the desirability of
including gift-negating language as the default option in their stan-
dard powers of attorney in the future. There is no protection for
past clients however because, instead of this rule being prospective
only, the legislation expressly provides that "the provisions of sub-
sections A and B of § 11-9.5 of this act are declaratory of existing
law." 5 It is respectfully submitted that the precipitous response to
the Casey decision contained in section 11-9.5(A), i.e., the implied
power, is bad law and should be repealed or severely limited dur-
ing the 1993 session. An increasing number of cases are being dis-
covered where agents are making abusive and fraudulent use of
82. Id. § 11-9.5(C). This section reads:
The court shall determine the amounts, recipients and proportions of any gifts of the
principal's property after considering all relevant factors including, without limita-
tion, (i) the size of the principal's estate, (ii) the principal's foreseeable obligations
and maintenance needs, (iii) the principal's personal history of making, or joining in
the making of, lifetime gifts, (iv) the principal's estate plan, and (v) the tax effects of
the gifts.
Id.
83. By way of illustration, suppose an elderly person remarries following the death of a
spouse, gives a power of attorney (containing the standard "do all acts" language) to the
new spouse, and also makes some valuable gifts to the new spouse during the first two or
three years of their marriage, at which time the elderly person becomes incapacitated. What
will be the response of the principal's children of the first marriage as the new spouse uses
the implied power of § 11-9.5(A) to transfer significant wealth from principal to agent dur-
ing the period of the principal's incapacity?
84. The author has not found an authoritative solution to these problems, but one can
easily see the possibility of the government's claim that an agent who has the power to
appoint either (i) to himself, or (ii) to anyone dependent upon him for support, has a gen-
eral power of appointment under I.R.C. § 2514, (West 1989) for gift tax purposes, and I.R.C.
§ 2041 (West 1989), for estate tax purposes.
The rebutting proposition is that the language of I.R.C. §§ 2514(c)(3)(A) and
2041(b)(1)(C)(i) both exclude from the definition of a general power any power that is "not
exercisable by the "possessor" (§ 2514(c)(3)(A)) or "decedent" (§ 2041(b)(1)(C)(i)) except in
conjunction with the creator of the power...." I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1)(C)(i),
2514(c)(3)(A)(West 1989). And, it is argued, this definition prevents a revocable power of
attorney to make gifts from being classified as a general power of appointment because the
agent's power is subject to the principal's control during the principal's lifetime.
The possible federal estate and gift tax consequences will be largely a moot issue for the
great majority of clients, and their agents, whose estates will be below the federal exemption
equivalent of $600,000.00.
85. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 544, 1992 Va. Acts 687, cl.2 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 11-
9.5 (Cum. Supp. 1992) (editor's note)).
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general powers of attorney after a principal becomes incapacitated,
and this "implied power" rule will make it significantly more diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to rectify their actions in a number of cases.
D. Health Care Decisions
Virginia's statutory authority for a medical power of attorney
was enacted in 1989 and has been the subject of modification and
comment each year thereafter."8 Virginia's Natural Death Act was
enacted in 1983 and has been the subject of several amendments
and comments in the intervening years.8 7 The 1992 session re-
pealed the prior statutory basis for the medical power of attor-
ney,88 and significantly amended the Natural Death Act, which
now becomes the Health Care Decisions Act,"' to provide (among
other things) for a combined form, referred to as an "Advance
Medical Directive," that will encompass both the living will and
the medical power.90 This action does not endanger documents ex-
ecuted under the old laws because a grandfather provision contin-
ues their validity indefinitely."1 The new legislation92 mirrors the
old93 in scope and spirit but there is significant change in detail.
86. See J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law,
23 U. RICH. L. REv. 859, 862-63 (1989); J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 827, 836-37 (1990); and J. Rodney John-
son, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 925,
936 (1991).
87. J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U.
RICH. L. REV. 925, 936-37 (1991); and J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 859, 862 (1989); Dayna B. Matthew, Note,
The 'Terminal Condition' Condition in Virginia's Natural Death Act, 73 VA. L. REv. 749
(1987); Janice G. Murphy, Comment, The Virginia Natural Death Act - A Critical Analy-
sis, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 863 (1983).
88. Acts of Apr. 5, 1992, chs. 748 & 772, 1992 Va. Acts 1144, 1200, cl. 2, (repealing VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4).
89. Acts of Apr. 5, 1992, chs. 748 &772, 1992 Va. Acts 1144, 1200 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Cur. Supp. 1992)).
90. See id.
91. Acts of Apr. 5, 1992, chs. 748 & 772, 1992 Va. Acts 1144, 1200 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to 2993 editor's note (Cum. Supp. 1992)). The act provides as follows:
That whenever the conditions, requirements, provisions or contents of Article 8 (§
54.1-2981 et seq.) of Title 54.1 or § 37.1-134.4 were relied upon, prior to the effective
date of this act, in the execution of any declaration or the taking of any action which
was in compliance with such laws as they were then in effect, such declaration or
action shall remain valid and the provisions of this act shall not be construed to in-
validate, revoke, render illegal, or to be applicable to any such declaration or action.
Id.
92. See supra notes 89-90 & accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 87-88 & accompanying text.
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Notwithstanding the importance of this subject, space limitations
preclude complete treatment of these details in this review.
E. Fiduciary Investments
During the 1991 session the General Assembly requested the
Virginia Bar Association and the Virginia Bankers' Association "to
study the status of Virginia's lawful fiduciary investments, to rec-
ommend amendments, deletions and additions to the list and to
make other recommendations as deemed appropriate. 'e4 This joint
study recommended to the 1992 session
a total revision of Virginia's legal list (Virginia Code § 26-40) in or-
der to increase investment safety and to make the list more readily
usable by the individual consumer ... [and] a revision to Virginia's
prudent man rule to insure investment flexibility, to the advantage
of both Virginia beneficiaries and Virginia fiduciaries.95
In response to specific recommendations, the 1992 session,
among other things, replaced Virginia's traditional prudent man
rule 6 with a portfolio-oriented prudent investor rule,9 7 and re-
placed Virginia's nine-page and twenty-seven-category legal list
94. H.J. Res. 395, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1991), 1991 Va. Acts 1928.
95. REPORT OF THE WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES SECTION OF THE VIRGINIA BAR ASSOCIATION
AND THE VIRGINIA BANKERS ASSOCIATION ON FIDUCIARY INVESTMENTS, H. Doc. No. 40, 19 Va.
Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1992).
96. Prior to the 1992 amendment, Va. Code § 26-45.1 stated this rule as:
[T]he judgment of care under the circumstances then prevailing, which men of pru-
dence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not
in regard to speculation but in regard to the permanent disposition of their funds,
considering the probable income as well as the probable safety of their capital.
VA. CODE ANN. § 26-45.1 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
97. See Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 810, 1992 Va. Acts 1278 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-
45.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992). The section now provides:
[T]he judgment of care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances pre-
vailing from time to time, (including, but not limited to, general economic conditions,
anticipated tax consequences, the duties of the fiduciary and the interests of all bene-
ficiaries) that a prudent person familiar with such matters and acting in his own be-
half would exercise under the circumstances in order to accomplish the purposes set
forth in the controlling document. In investing pursuant to this standard, a fiduciary
shall consider individual investments in the context of the investment portfolio as a
whole and as part of the fiduciary's overall investment plan and shall have a duty to
diversify investments unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so. Any
determination of liability for investment performance shall consider not only the per-
formance of a particular investment, but also the performance of the portfolio as a
whole.
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with a one-page and three-category version. 8 Space limitations of
this annual review preclude detailed treatment of this legislation,
but the reader should find the several sources cited in the foot-
notes very helpful in gaining an understanding of these new laws.
One unsettling concern under the new prudent investor rule re-
lates to the division of investment return between the principal
and income accounts. This division is currently determined under
Virginia's Uniform Principal and Income Act99 which, in turn, ba-
ses its allocation rules on the assumption that investment decisions
are being guided by a traditional prudent man rule. Query: Is a
fiduciary investing under the new rule who is nevertheless required
to distribute under the old rule being fair to both income benefi-
ciaries and remainder beneficiaries? What personal liability, if any,
does such a fiduciary have? 100
For helpful background and analysis, see Thomas S. Word, Jr., and Wendy B. Gayle, The
Proposed Virginia Prudent Investor Statute: Is It Time for Virginia to Change?, VA. ST. B.
T& AND EST. SEC. NEWSL., Spring 1992, at 7.
98. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 810, 1992 Va. Acts 1278 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-40
(Repl. Vol. 1992)). Note that § 26-40 continues to apply to investments of the Virginia
Housing Development Authority and the Virginia Resources Authority. Section 26-40.01(C)
currently provides that:
any reference to the Virginia "legal list" or to § 26-40 or any predecessor statute
contained in a will, trust, or other instrument that was irrevocable on June 30, 1992,
shall be construed to refer to such section as in effect on June 30, 1992, or at such
earlier time as may be specified in the controlling document, absent an expression of
intent to the contrary contained in such document.
VA. CODE ANN. § 26-40.01(C) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
The three categories are (i) obligations of the Commonwealth, its agencies and political
subdivisions, (ii) obligations of the United States, and (iii) deposits in Virginia financial
institutions that are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the National
Credit Union Share Insurance Fund. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-40.01(B) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
99. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-253 to -268 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
100. The most important aspect of trust law cast into doubt by the acceptance of an
unconstrained [Prudent Man] Rule on portfolio theory grounds is the traditional allo-
cation of investment returns. No principle in the law of trusts seems more settled
than the rule that income beneficiaries receive ordinary cash dividends from common
stock ownership and remaindermen receive capital gains if the stock is sold. . . . Ac-
ceptance of portfolio theory, however, would undermine the traditional rule.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 52, 99 (1987)(footnotes omitted). This author discusses a variety of possible
ways to allocate receipts under the new rule but notes that "the revision of the Uniform
Principal and Income Act to work out the practical details of a total return allocation
scheme would be particularly helpful in making a portfolio theory approach readily availa-
ble to private trusts." Id. at 101.
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F. Incorporation of Fiduciary Powers - Uniform Custodial
Trust Act
Code section 64.1-57 contains a rather exhaustive enumeration
of fiduciary powers that may be incorporated by reference into a
will or trust, individually or as a group. It is the custom of Virginia
lawyers to make regular use of this provision. Section 64.1-57(1)1,
which confers upon a fiduciary the power to make distributions to
a minor or disabled beneficiary in four separate ways, was
amended in 1992 by the addition of a power to make distributions
to an incapacitated 10 ' beneficiary under the recently enacted Uni-
form Custodial Trust Act.10 2 The new language reads as follows:
"(5) to an adult person or bank authorized to exercise trust powers
as custodial trustee for an incapacitated beneficiary under the Uni-
form Custodial Trust Act. . . to be held as custodial trustee under
the terms of such act."' 03 This very helpful provision will not only
be available in documents executed after its effective date but, due
to a 1989 amendment to section 64.1-57,04 to existing documents
as well. The 1989 amendment provided that, absent the expression
of a contrary intent in a document, "the incorporation by reference
of powers enumerated by this statute shall refer to those powers
existing at the time of death."'105
G. Self-Proving Affidavit - Notarization
Sections 64.1-87.1'06 and 64.1-87.2107 establish procedures for
making wills self-proved, i.e., eliminating the need for attesting
101. "Incapacitated," for purposes of the Uniform Custodial Trust Act, "means lacking
the ability to manage property and business affairs effectively by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication,
confinement, detention by a foreign power, disappearance, minority, or other disabling
cause." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-34.1 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
102. Act of Mar. 24, 1990, ch. 264, 1990 Va. Acts 360 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-
34.1 to .19 (Cum. Supp. 1992)), discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates:
Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 24 U. RiCH. L. REV. 827, 829-30 (1990). For a pre-enactment
Virginia analysis and discussion, see Louis A. Mezzullo & Michael C. Roach, The Uniform
Custodial Trust Act: An Alternative to Adult Guardianship, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 65 (1989).
103. Act of Mar. 31, 1992, ch. 584, 1992 Va. Acts 780 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
57(1)%(5) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
104. Act of Apr. 5, 1989, ch. 736, 1989 Va. Acts 1988, 1992 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
64.1-57(4) (Repl. Vol. 1991)), discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates:
Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 859, 861 (1989).
105. 1989 Va. Acts 1988, 1992, VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(4) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-87.1 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
107. Id. § 64.1-87.2 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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witnesses to appear and testify at probate in the ordinary case.
The procedure requires a notary public'08 to place the testator and
witness under oath and then ask them questions similar to those
typically asked by the clerk at probate, the answers to which are
then embodied in the notarized affidavit 09
Within the past year the Attorney General was asked about the
propriety of one who was named in the will as executor or trustee
also serving as the notary on the self-proving affidavit.-Under Vir-
ginia law a notary that performs a notarial act with respect to
which "the notary or his spouse shall be a party, or in which either
of them shall have a direct beneficial interest" is "guilty of official
misconduct."110 The Attorney General concluded that such a per-
son would have "a direct beneficial interest" in the will and thus
was prohibited from serving as notary on the self-proving affida-
vit."' It was believed that this result might create an unreasonable
hardship in a number of cases when wills were executed in rural
areas, homes, hospitals, etc., where the location of an "indepen-
dent" notary might be a problem. Accordingly, a 1992 amendment
eliminates this problem by providing that "[a] notary nominated
as a fiduciary in a will shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed a
party to the will or to have a direct beneficial interest therein. '1
2
H. Pour Over Trust - Residency of Trustee
The 1991 session amended section 64.1-73 by authorizing certain
nonresident persons to serve as "sole trustee of an inter vivos trust
108. Although the text of this article speaks only of notaries, and the 1992 amendment,
discussed infra at note 112 and accompanying text, is restricted to the same, the self-prov-
ing affidavits may be executed before certain other public officials. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-
87.1, -87.2 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
109. See id.
110. Id. § 47.1-30 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
111. 1991-92 Va. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 208-09 (Aug. 14, 1991). A portion of this opinion
reads as follows:
A prior Opinion of this Office concludes, however, that the General Assembly in-
tended a "direct beneficial interest," as used in § 47.1-30, to mean profit, value,
worth, advantage or use resulting from a transaction or derived from a writing. 1984-
85 Va. Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. [] 229. As executor of the will, the notary will receive
compensation for his services, pursuant to § 26-30, if it is admitted to probate. It is
my opinion, therefore, that a notary has a "direct beneficial interest" in a will naming
him as its executor, and that § 47.1-30 prohibits him from notarizing the self-proving
certificate in such circumstances.
Id.
112. Act of Mar. 5, 1992, ch. 194, 1992 Va. Acts 242 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 47.1-30
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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without thereby disqualifying the trust from receiving testamen-
tary additions. '"11 The 1992 amendment to this section changes
the requisite point in time for determining the required residency
of a trustee from the "testator's death""' 4 to the "time the devise
or bequest is to be distributed to the trustee or trustees. 11 5 This
change will allow time for corrective action to be taken in those
cases where a nonpermissible person or corporation is named at
the time of the testator's death.
I. Power to Invade Principal - Constructional Rule
Section 64.1-67.2 was enacted in 1988116 to eliminate certain tax
exposures in trusts where a fiduciary/beneficiary had a power to
invade principal for his own benefit."' This section was further
amended in 1991 to clarify the original intent, however the lan-
guage of the clarified original dealt only with troublesome powers
over the principal of a trust."' The 1992 amendment further clari-
fies the meaning of this section by declaring that it applies to a
power to "distribute the income, principal or corpus, or any com-
bination thereof .... ""1 The emphasized language is that added
in 1992.120
J. Charitable Gifts - Life Insurance
A recent private letter ruling issued by the Internal Revenue
Service concluded that a New York donor would not be entitled to
any income, gift, or estate tax deduction for a gift of a life insur-
ance policy to a charity because, under applicable state law, the
charity did not have an insurable interest in the donor's life.' 2' A
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73 (Repl. Vol. 1991); see J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and
Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 925, 930 (1991).
114. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
115. Act of Mar. 2, 1992, ch. 66, 1992 Va. Acts 63 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-73
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
116. Act of Mar. 29, 1988, ch. 346, 1988 Va. Acts 417 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-67.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
117. See J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law,
22 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 764-66 (1988).
118. See Act of Mar. 20, 1991, ch. 432, 1991 Va. Acts 646 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
64.1-67.2 (Repl. Vol. 1991)); J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey
of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 925, 927-8 (1991).
119. Act of Apr. 15, 1992, ch. 332, 1992 Va. Acts 416 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
67.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
120. See id.
121. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-100-016 (Nov. 30, 1990).
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1992 amendment to section 38.2-301, which is stated to be "declar-
atory of existing law,"' 22 prevents similar problems from arising
under Virginia law.
123
K. Parental Abandonment - Forfeiture of Intestacy Rights
Section 64.1-16.3, which deals with the forfeiture of various
rights124 by a deserting spouse in the estate of the deserted spouse,
has been amended by the addition of a provision for the forfeiture
of parental inheritance rights from the estate of a child the parent
abandoned while the child was a minor or incapacitated. 12 5
L. Murder - Forfeiture of Survivorship Rights
Virginia adopted very broad legislation designed to prevent con-
victed murderers from succeeding to any property from their vic-
tims in 1981,126 and further broadened the scope of this legislation
by expanding the definition of a slayer in 1987.121 Under the origi-
nal version of this statute, a "slayer" of a cotenant in a tenancy
involving survivorship rights was prohibited from acquiring the co-
tenant's half-interest by survivorship; instead the death of the co-
122. Act of Feb. 25, 1992, ch. 8, 1992 Va. Acts 7, cl. 2.-
123. The text of this amendment reads as follows:
In the case of an organization described in § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code,
the lawful and substantial economic interest required in subdivision 2 of this subsec-
tion shall be deemed to exist where (i) the insured or proposed insured has either
assigned all or part of his ownership rights in a policy or contract to such an organiza-
tion or has executed a written consent to the issuance of a policy or contract to such
organization and (ii) such organization is named in the policy or contract as owner or
as beneficiary.
Id. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-301(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
124. The forfeitable rights are "intestate succession, elective share, exempt property, fam-
ily allowance, and homestead allowance." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16(3)(A) (Cum. Supp. 1992).
125. Act of Apr. 6, 1992, ch. 775, 1992 Va. Acts 1210 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
16.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 1992)). This amendment reads in full as follows:
If a parent willfully deserts or abandons his or her minor or incapacitated child and
such desertion or abandonment continues until the death of the child, the parent
shall be barred of all interests in the estate by intestate succession unless the parent
resumes the parental relationship and duties and such parental relationship and du-
ties continue until the death of the child.
Id.
126. Act of Mar. 21, 1981, ch. 469, 1981 Va. Acts 701 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-406
(Repl. Vol. 1986)). This enactment is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and
Estates, 68 VA. L. REv. 521, 525-28 (1982).
127. Act of Mar. 26, 1987, ch. 498, 1987 Va. Acts 730 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-401
(Cum. Supp. 1992)). This development is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts,
and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 855, 862-63 (1987).
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tenant caused a severance of the tenancy and the slain tenant's
half-interest passed with his other property by will or intestate
succession (but not to the slayer). 128 The 1992 amendment contin-
ues this rule as to cotenancies not involving survivorship.12" How-
ever, with regard to any form of survivorship tenancies, the 1992
amendment provides for the passing of the interest of the slayer
"to the estate of the decedent as though the slayer had prede-
ceased the decedent.' 30
M. Disclaimers - Mailed Notice
The original language of section 64.1-189, which deals with the
time and place of filing disclaimers to property passing under tes-
tamentary instruments requires, among other things, that a disclai-
mant mail a copy of the disclaimer instrument to the decedent's
personal representative or donee (if a power of appointment is in-
volved). 1 1 The 1992 amendment dispenses with this requirement
where "the person making the disclaimer is the sole personal rep-
resentative of the decedent or the donee.' 3 2
The original language of section 64.1-192, which deals with the
time and place of delivery or filing disclaimers to property passing
under nontestamentary instruments, requires, among other things,
that a copy of the disclaimer instrument be (i) personally delivered
or (ii) sent by registered mail to whomever has legal title to, or
possession of, the disclaimed property.' 3 The 1992 amendment
adds a third acceptable method of delivering the disclaimer instru-
ment - by certified mail.134
128. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-406 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
129. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 521, 1992 Va. Acts 664 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-406
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
130. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 521, 1992 Va. Acts 664 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 55-405
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
131. Act of Apr. 6, 1972, ch. 449, 1972 Va. Acts 513 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-189 (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
132. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 514, 1992 Va. Acts 659 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
189 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
133. Act of Apr. 6, 1972, ch. 449, 1972 Va. Acts 513 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-192 (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
134. Act of Mar. 30, 1992, ch. 514, 1992 Va. Acts 659 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-
192 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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N. Corporate Fiduciary Fees - Affiliated Mutual Fund
Among other things, section 26-44.1 prohibits a corporate fiduci-
ary investing in an affiliated mutual fund from receiving a fiduci-
ary commission to the extent that it or its affiliates receive com-
pensation for services rendered to the affiliated fund absent a
written agreement to the contrary with the trust's creator or af-
fected beneficiary. 13 5 The 1992 amendment provides, as an alterna-
tive to such consent, for the allowance of such fiduciary commis-
sion if (i) the fiduciary discloses how it computes its compensation
for such services rendered, and (ii) such compensation does not ex-
ceed the customary amount charged for like services to nonfiduci-
ary accounts. 136
III. 1991-92 JUDICIAL OPINIONS
A. Will Construction - Precatory Language
In Gillespie v. Davis,37 the testator's will stated "I give and de-
vise all of my realestate [sic] to [X, Y, and Z]. They are to share
equally and the disposal will be in their hands."'"8 The will also
stated:
It is my desire that Lee Davis, the present renter of the shop area,
(fenced-in compound) be allowed to purchase that area and the
equipment I own in that area for the fair market value. The equip-
ment includes [description omitted]. In the event that Lee Davis
does not desire to buy the moving equipment it shall be sold at auc-
tion and the proceeds divided equally among the before-mentioned
heirs. 3
The issue between the beneficiaries under the third clause and
the person named in the sixth clause was whether the language of
the sixth clause gave the latter an enforceable right, or whether it
was merely precatory. 40 Applying settled rules of construction, the
Virginia Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 26-44.1 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
136. Act of Apr. 3, 1992, ch. 684, 1992 Va. Acts 1007 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 26-44.1
(Repl. Vol. 1992)).
137. 242 Va. 300, 410 S.E.2d 613 (1991).
138. Id. at 302, 410 S.E.2d at 615.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 303, 410 S.E.2d at 615.
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"that the third and sixth clauses create an ambiguity in the will
and that this was a proper case for the use of extrinsic evi-
dence."'' Finding that "this evidence is overwhelming that the
testator intended for Davis to have the right to purchase the shop
area for its fair market value,"'1 42 the court affirmed the decision
below. 143
B. Death Taxes - Apportionment
In Lynchburg College v. Central Fidelity Bank,'" the testator's
will made forty-one separate gifts prior to leaving the residue, one
half to certain charities and one half to certain relatives.'" Virginia
law provides generally that an estate's death tax burden is to be
apportioned among all of its beneficiaries in proportion to each
beneficiary's gift.146 The apportionment law "expressly preserve[s],
however, 'the right of a testator to designate such parts of his as-
sets as he desires to bear the burden of all taxes.' ',147 Item I of the
testator's will provided that "I desire my just debts and all ex-
penses of the administration of my estate, including such taxes as
may be levied against my estate, paid as soon after my death as
practicable.' 48 The question before the court was whether Item I
of the testator's will manifested an intent that no taxes be appor-
tioned against the forty pre-residuary beneficiaries and that all
taxes be charged against the residuary estate. 4 Concluding that
precedent mandated an affirmative answer to this question, 5 ' the
trial court's decision was affirmed. 15'
141. Id. at 304, 410 S.E.2d at 616.
142. Id. at 304-05, 410 S.E.2d at 616.
143. Id. at 306, 410 S.E.2d at 617.
144. 242 Va. 292, 410 S.E.2d 617 (1991).
145. Id. at 295, 410 S.E.2d at 618.
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-161 (Repl. Vol. 1991). This section limits this rule by providing
that "in making such proration each such person shall have the benefit of any exemptions,
deductions and exclusions allowed by such law in respect of such person or the property
passing to him." Id.
147. Lynchburg College, 242 Va. at 296, 410 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting Baylor v. National
Bank of Commerce, 194 Va. 1, 7, 72 S.E.2d 282, 285 (1952)).
148. 242 Va. at 294, 410 S.E.2d at 618.
149. Id. at 292, 410 S.E.2d at 617.
150. Id. at 295, 410 S.E.2d at 619 (citing Baylor v. National Bank of Commerce, 194 Va. 1,
72 S.E.2d 282 (1952)).
151. Lynchburg College, 242 Va. at 299, 410 S.E.2d at 621.
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C. Death Taxes - Charging Tenancy by Entirety Property
Virginia's death tax apportionment laws contain an "anti-appor-
tionment" statute that preserves a testator's right to "designate
the fund or funds or property out of which such payment shall be
made.' 1 52 In Estate of Reno v. Commissioner,53 the question
before the Fourth Circuit was whether one could direct that death
taxes generated by out of state realty be paid from Virginia realty
owned with a spouse as tenants by the entirety.5 5 The majority in
this 5-4 decision concluded that such action would be "impermissi-
ble under Virginia probate, property, and tax apportionment
law,' 55 calling attention to the fact that
[t]hough a testator is unequivocally forbidden to alienate entireties
property by his will, the [Commissioner] 's construction of § 64.1-165
would permit a testator to do the functional equivalent by simply
designating his entireties property as the fund from which all estate
taxes are to be paid. 156
D. Survivorship Tenancy - Dower
The court in Funches v. Funches,57 following its recent decision
wherein the same issue was raised,' 58 held that a deed purporting
to convey realty to persons not married to each other as tenants by
the entirety with the right of survivorship, instead conveyed the
same to them as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. 159 In
addition, the court concluded that, due to the nature of a joint
estate with survivorship, the spouse of the first of the joint tenants
to die would not be entitled to any dower rights. 60
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-165 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
153. 945 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
154. Id. at 733-34.
155. Id. at 733.
156. Id. at 734 (quoting Estate of Reno v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 955, 969-70 (4th Cir.
1990)(Hall, J., dissenting). This case is analyzed and discussed in Nan L. Coleman, Estate of
Reno v. Commissioner: The Achilles Heel of Tax Apportionment, 9 VA. ST. B. TR. & EsT.
SECT. NEWSL., Spring 1992, at 15.
157. 243 Va. 26, 413 S.E.2d 44 (1992).
158. Gant v. Gant, 237 Va. 588, 379 S.E.2d 331 (1989).
159. Funches, 243 Va. at 29-30, 413 S.E.2d at 46.
160. Id. at 30-31, 413 S.E.2d at 47. Note that the laws of dower and curtesy were repealed
effective January 1, 1991, except as to persons who died prior to that time. Act of Apr. 9,
1990, ch. 831, 1990 Va. Acts 1354.
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E. Acts Barring Property Rights - Non-Slayer
The 1981 session enacted comprehensive legislation to prevent
one who fit within the definition of a "slayer" of another to receive
any form of benefit from the person slain. 6" However, this legisla-
tion failed to state whether its remedy was (i) merely cumulative
with existing common law remedies, or (ii) exclusive, thereby abro-
gating existing common law remedies. 6 2 In Peoples Security Life
Insurance v. Arrington,6 ' W was the beneficiary of H's life insur-
ance and made claim for the proceeds after H "was stabbed and
shot to death while [H and W] were in their automobile. No one
has been prosecuted for the murder of [H]. However, [W] remains
available for prosecution.' 64 The court's examination of the 1981
statutory provisions disclosed no language or intent to abrogate the
then existing common law remedies. 65 Thus, although W did not
fit within the statutory definition of a slayer, the court concluded
that
under these circumstances, Code § 55-401(1) does not preclude Peo-
ples from attempting to prove that [W] was not entitled to the pro-
ceeds of her husband's life insurance policy if it can prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that she 'procured, participated in or
otherwise directed' her husband's death.166
F. Wills - Interpretation
Westmoreland County Volunteer Rescue Squad v. Melnick 67 is
a will interpretation case that reverses a better-reasoned trial court
opinion. However, no new laws or principles are announced in this
case and it will be profitless to reargue the facts.
161. Act of Mar. 21, 1981, ch. 469, 1981 Va. Acts 701 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-401
to -415 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1992)). For background, see Sandra G. Schneider,
Note, Barring Slayers' Acquisition of Property Rights in Virginia: A Proposed Statute, 14
U. RICH. L. REv. 251 (1979).
162. See J. Rodney Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 68 VA. L. REv. 521, 528 (1982).
163. 243 Va. 89, 412 S.E.2d 705 (1992).
164. Id. at 90, 412 S.E.2d at 706.
165. Id. at 91-92, 412 S.E.2d at 707.
166. Id. at 92, 412 S.E.2d at 707.
167. 243 Va. 222, 414 S.E.2d 817 (1992).
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G. Durable Power of Attorney - Agent's Power to Make Gifts
In Estate of Casey v. Commissioner,168 the Fourth Circuit had to
determine, for federal transfer tax purposes, whether Virginia law
authorized an agent under a durable power of attorney to make
gifts on behalf of an incapacitated principal where the broadly-
drawn power of attorney was silent on that point.169 Although the
principal had no history of gift making, she had joined in gifts of
real estate made by her husband in order to release her inchoate
rights of dower therein.170 The court's conclusion that Virginia law
did not authorize her agent to make such gifts'M7 resulted in legis-
lation in the 1992 session that is commented upon in Part II, Para-
graph C, of this article. 7
2
IV. CONCLUSION
The 1992 session produced more than the normal volume of
wills, trusts, and estates-related legislation which, overall, will
work to the good of the practitioner and the Commonwealth. The
infant spouse enactment is an embarrassment that will probably
amount to no significant damage. The separate property amend-
ment, however, holds the potential for discriminatory treatment
and injury to a number of innocent persons and thus it, along with
the too short, five-year pull-back amendment, deserves to be reex-
amined. Most importantly, however, because of the number of per-
sons likely to be adversely affected thereby, the unfortunate legis-
lation recognizing an "implied power" of an agent to make gifts on
behalf of an incapacitated principal needs to be repealed or se-
verely limited in the 1993 session.
168. 948 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1991), rehearing denied, - F.2d - (12/4/91).
169. See id. at 896-97.
170. Id. at 896, 901.
171. Id. at 901.
172. For an analysis and discussion of this case, see Deneka, supra note 77.
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